Noahide Law sets up a two-tier legal system... there is one law for Jews (613 commandments) and Noahide Law for non-Jews. Each Noahide Law comes with what is called "dinim" or "sub-laws" which go under each of the Noahide Laws. Some Jews say there are 66 of these sub-laws (here), some Jews say you need to learn more than just the 7 Noahide Laws (here) and some Jews say that non-Jews must follow all 613 of the Jewish commandments under the dinim system (here). Here is more evidence that if the Noahide Laws were ever applied, we might have to follow an even more draconian system than what is already planned.
Before assessing Giustiniani’s conduct, Isserles propounds a far-reaching proposition regarding the content of Noahide law. He holds that the laws that non-Jews must follow are, in principle, the very same laws governing the conduct of Jews. Isserles derives this proposition from contested authority holding, on the basis of Scriptural exegesis, that Noahide obligation of dinim means that “Noahide laws are the same as the Jews were commanded at Sinai, … except where there is direct evidence of a difference.”89 Isserles cites the Mishneh Torah for further support; according to Isserles’ reading, Maimonides concluded that although non-Jews need follow only the seven Noahide laws, the content of those laws are derived from Jewish law applicable to Jews.90
For Isserles, then, “Noahide laws” are informed not simply by basic universal principles of justice and equity that lie outside the framework of Jewish law, but rather by the entire set of intricate rules governing Jews unless Talmudic authority explicitly indicates a dissimilarity. In so holding, Isserles goes even further than what he takes to be Maimonides’ conclusion that each Noahide law is informed by the Jewish law in that area. Isserles posits that, at least in regards to civil law, including commercial and monetary matters, Noahide law is generally no different than Jewish law even where Jewish law does not fit within one of the remaining six categories of Noahide law.91
law is traditionally divided into two fundamental categories, typically labeled by the Aramaic terms de-oraita (“of the Torah”) and de-rabbanan (“of the scholars”).92 Deoraita law is composed of the foundational rules stated expressly in the Pentateuch or otherwise deemed to be in accordance with a tradition given to Moses at Mount Sinai. De-rabbanan law consists of supplemental rabbinic edicts. Even those rabbinic authorities who hold that Noahide law is to some degree informed by Jewish law typically limit that holding to the foundational precepts of de-oraita law. But in defining and applying Jewish law in the remainder of his ruling, Isserles subjects Giustiniani to the scrutiny not only of de-oraita, but also de-rabbanan law. In sum, although he does not say so explicitly, Isserles evidently posits that the requirement of dinim means that nonJews must abide by Jewish law in monetary and commercial matters, including rabbinical edicts issued subsequently to and promulgating obligations that go beyond the fundamental precepts given to Moses at Mount Sinai.
SOURCE: Neil Weinstock Netanel. "Maharam of Padua v. Giustiniani; the Sixteenth-Century Origins of the Jewish Law of Copyright". 44 Houston Law Review (forthcoming 2007). Retrieved 08/07/2020 from: https://www.law.uh.edu/ipil/symposium/prior/final/Netanel.pdf
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